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We examine the relation between information externalities along the supply chain and voluntary 
disclosure. Information transfers from a major customer’s earnings announcement (EA) can 
substitute for its supplier’s disclosure. Conversely, if the customer’s EA increases uncertainties 
regarding the supplier’s future prospects, it can increase the demand for disclosure. After 
controlling for information incorporated in supplier returns, we find that the supplier is more likely 
to issue earnings guidance after the customer’s EA when the EA news deviates more from the 
market’s expectation. The positive effect of the customer’s news on earnings guidance is weaker 
when common investors, supply-chain analysts, or a common industry allow investors to better 
understand the value implications of the news, while the effect increases with the importance of 
the customer to the supplier. The effect is also stronger when the EA news is negative than positive. 
Collectively, the results suggest that supply-chain relationships influence voluntary disclosure. 
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This study examines how a major customer’s earnings announcement (EA) influences its 
supplier’s earnings guidance decision.1  Prior research suggests that information transfers from 
economically linked firms substitute for a firm’s voluntary disclosure, because the external signal 
can provide value-relevant information to investors (Olsen and Dietrich 1985; Pownall and Waymire 
1989; Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter 2012). The customer’s EA, however, could increase 
uncertainties regarding the supplier’s future prospects, which would prompt investors to demand the 
supplier’s disclosure. The voluntary disclosure literature documents that managers strategically 
increase disclosure to convey good news when an external signal is unfavorable but decrease 
disclosure when it is favorable (Bergman and Roychowdhury 2008; Sletten 2012). Extant studies, 
however, do not fully consider the demand side of disclosures. If investors demand additional 
disclosure to fully absorb an external signal (i.e., customer EA news in our setting), the signal would 
prompt an increase in disclosure regardless of whether the signal is favorable or unfavorable. 
A major customer’s EA is an ideal setting to examine the demand side of disclosure in a context 
of information externalities, because two separate signals from the market, i.e., the respective stock 
price changes of the customer and the supplier, have different implications for the demand for the 
supplier’s disclosure. To the extent that investors can incorporate the customer’s news in updating 
their beliefs about the supplier valuation, as reflected in supplier returns (Pandit, Wasley, and Zach 
2011), the demand for disclosure would subside with the magnitude of supplier returns, which is 
consistent with the substitution effect of information transfers (Pownall and Waymire 1989; 
                                                
1 We refer to an individual customer that comprises 10% or more of firm sales as a major customer. We focus on the 
effect of a major customer’s EA on the voluntary disclosure of its supplier, but not the effect of a supplier’s EA on the 
voluntary disclosure of its major customer, because the impact of a major customer on its supplier is economically 
much more important than the impact of a supplier on its major customer. In our sample, for example, the median 
proportion of sales from a supplier to its customer is 18% of the supplier’s total sales, while the median proportion of 
the supplier’s purchases is only 0.17% (0.31%) of its customer’s total sales (cost of sales). 





Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter 2012). The supplier valuation, however, would have an idiosyncratic 
component that is not fully impounded in the supplier’s price reaction to the customer’s EA. In 
response to the customer’s EA news, for example, the supplier could alter its operating strategy, 
product mix, or investment decisions, all of which would be private information residing with the 
supplier’s manager but not observed by external investors. Moreover, investors do not possess a 
full set of information on supply-chain specifics, such as details of transactions with the customer, 
relationship-specific investments, order backlog, and receivables related to the customer. Investors 
then would have diffuse priors about the supplier’s anticipated actions in response to the 
customer’s EA news. Therefore, when supplier returns are controlled for in our setting, customer 
returns are likely to be associated with the idiosyncratic component of the supplier valuation not 
reflected in supplier returns that increases the demand for additional information.2 We thus predict 
that investors’ demand for supplier disclosure is positively associated with the magnitude of 
customer returns around the customer’s EA. Put differently, as the customer’s EA news deviates 
more from the market’s expectation, investors would demand more information to process the 
news, and the supplier’s managers, in response, are more likely to issue earnings guidance. 
Using 8,434 supplier firm-years that report the identity of a major customer in their 10-Ks over 
the 2001-2012 period, we examine the relation between the customer’s quarterly EA news and its 
supplier’s earnings guidance. We use the absolute value of the customer’s market-adjusted returns 
over the customer’s EA window to capture the magnitude of the EA news (irrespective of the sign 
of the news). Similarly, we measure the absolute value of the supplier’s market-adjusted returns 
during the same window to capture the amount of the news already assimilated by the supplier’s 
                                                
2 Our analyses in Online Appendix 2 provide support for this argument. Specifically, we find that the residual of 
customer returns, which represents the part of customer news that has not been impounded in supplier returns, is 
significantly and positively associated with our proxies for investors’ opinion divergence. 





investors. To capture the supplier’s voluntary disclosure, we examine the supplier’s earnings 
guidance issued within a 45-day period subsequent to the customer’s EA. Earnings guidance is an 
important communication channel through which managers convey their expectations of firms’ 
future performance to the capital market (Hirst, Koonce, and Venkataraman 2008). 
After controlling for the customer’s news already incorporated in supplier returns, we first find that 
a supplier is more likely to issue earnings guidance subsequent to its customer’s EA when the EA news 
deviates more from the market’s expectation. Given that investors are not fully informed about the 
details of supply-chain specifics and that they face uncertainty about the supplier’s reactions to the 
customer’s news, this result is consistent with the notion that a greater surprise reflected in the customer 
returns would increase investors’ demand for the supplier’s disclosure and that the supplier managers 
respond to such demands by providing earnings guidance.3 In contrast, we find that the magnitude of 
the supplier returns included as a control variable has a significantly negative effect on earnings 
guidance, consistent with the substitution effect of information transfers. A series of falsification tests 
confirms that our results are unlikely to be attributable to common economic shocks to the customer 
and the supplier. The results are also robust to excluding suppliers that appear to pre-commit to issuing 
earnings guidance, ensuring that our results are not driven by pre-scheduled earnings guidance.4 
We next examine whether the supply-chain information environment and characteristics 
explain cross-sectional variations of the relation between the customer’s EA news and the 
supplier’s earnings guidance. If the supply-chain information environment allows investors to 
better understand the value-implications of the news, investors will lower their demand for the 
                                                
3 The marginal change in the probability of earnings guidance is about 1% when the magnitude of customer returns over the 
EA window increases from the first to the third quartile. This marginal effect is economically meaningful and not too large 
to be implausible, given that the unconditional probability of earnings guidance is only about 14% in our sample. 
4 Our results are robust to changing the supplier’s guidance window to a 30- or 60-day period subsequent to its 
customer’s EA. 





supplier’s earnings guidance. Consistent with this prediction, we find that the positive effect of 
customers’ EA news on its supplier’s earnings guidance is less pronounced when the two firms 
share common investors, supply-chain analysts, or a common industry.5 We also find that the 
positive relation is more pronounced when the supplier makes a larger amount of relationship-
specific investments, but less pronounced when the supplier can easily replace the customer. These 
results suggest that the effect of a customer’s EA news on the supplier’s earnings guidance is 
greater when the customer is more important to the supplier. Furthermore, we find that the effect 
of the customer’s news on its supplier’s earnings guidance is significantly stronger when the 
customer’s news is negative than when it is positive, although the effect is significantly positive 
in both cases, consistent with the notion that the supplier faces asymmetric payoffs with respect to 
the customer’s performance (Drake and Haka 2008; Hui, Klasa, and Yeung 2012). 
We perform several additional analyses. First, we examine upward and downward guidance 
revisions separately. We find that the customer’s news increases upward (but not downward) 
earnings guidance, consistent with managers having a greater incentive to disclose good news than 
bad news (Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki 2009). Upward guidance revisions, however, are significantly 
associated with both positive and negative news from the customer’s EA. Second, we decompose the 
customer’s EA returns into various news components and examine the effect of each component 
separately. We find that while the customer news from realized earnings reduces the supplier’s 
earnings guidance (and thereby substitutes for earnings guidance), forward-looking information 
irregularly bundled with EA and harder-to-interpret information (i.e., the news component unexplained 
by realized earnings and bundled earnings guidance) increase the guidance. Third, we find that part of 
                                                
5 We use these variables as proxies for the information environment, under the assumption that the supplier’s investors 
can better process the customer’s EA news when they have more knowledge about the customer-supplier relationship 
through their direct ownership in the customer, assistance from supply-chain analysts, and/or their expertise in the 
customer’s industry. We also examine sharing a common location as another proxy for the information environment 
and find that the effect is not statistically significant at conventional levels (p-value = 0.13). 





the customer news not incorporated in the supplier return is significantly and positively associated with 
supplier investors’ opinion divergence, mitigating a concern that the residual only captures the 
irrelevance of the customer’s news to the supplier. Lastly, we confirm that the supplier’s direct 
learning from the customer’s EA or herding in disclosure is unlikely to explain our results. 
Our study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, we contribute to the literature 
by examining how a customer’s EA news affects investors’ demand for supplier disclosure. Prior 
studies suggest that information transfers from an economically linked firm would substitute for 
voluntary disclosure (Pownall and Waymire 1989; Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter 2012). We find, 
however, that while customer news reflected in supplier returns substitutes for earnings guidance, part 
of customer news not impounded in supplier valuation is positively associated with investors’ demand 
for earnings guidance. It is novel to document that the two signals created by the customers’ EA (i.e., 
the respective stock price changes of the customer and the supplier) have opposite implications for the 
supplier’s disclosure; extant research only documents that the two signals are positively correlated (Olsen 
and Dietrich 1985; Pandit et al. 2011). 
While our study is related to studies that examine external signals as determinants of voluntary 
disclosure (e.g., Bergman and Roychowdhury 2008; Sletten 2012), our results are not easily 
inferred from prior studies. While Bergman and Roychowdhury (2008) and Sletten (2012) focus 
on managers’ strategic disclosure, our study aims to explore the demand side of voluntary 
disclosure, i.e., whether investors who are less informed about the value implications of the 
external signal would demand earnings guidance. Furthermore, while these two studies document 
an increase in earnings guidance only after unfavorable external signals, we find that both positive 
and negative signals increase a manager’s tendency to issue earnings guidance when investors face 
uncertainties while processing the news. 





We also contribute to the literature on the customer-supplier relationship. 6  We extend the 
literature by documenting that the customer-supplier relationship has important implications for 
voluntary disclosure and hence information environment. For example, while Madsen (2017) 
investigates investors’ acquisition of customer information around suppliers’ EAs, we focus on 
investors’ demand for supplier information after customers’ EAs. With different focuses, Madsen 
(2017) and our study together help depict a more complete picture of how investors’ information 
demands shape the information environment of firms along the supply chain. Given that nearly one 
half of public firms in the U.S. report the identities of their major customers in annual reports (Ellis, 
Fee, and Thomas 2012) and experience information externalities from the customer’s EA on a regular 
basis, our results offer insights into how such a reporting environment and recurring information 
externalities affect a firm’s voluntary disclosure decisions.7 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews prior research and 
develops our hypotheses. Section III details the sample selection and research design. Sections IV 
and V discuss the empirical results, and Section VI concludes the paper. 
 
II. LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Customer-supplier Relationship 
                                                
6 Prior studies in this literature examine the impacts of the customer-supplier relationship on firm performance and 
cost of equity (Patatoukas 2012; Dhaliwal, Judd, Serfling, and Shaikh 2016), capital structure (Titman and Wessels 
1988; Banerjee, Dasgupta, and Kim 2008), bank loan contracting (Kim, Song, and Zhang 2015; Cen, Dasgupta, 
Elkamhi, and Pungaliya 2016), earnings management and accounting conservatism (Raman and Shahrur 2008; Hui et 
al. 2012), analysts’ forecasts (Guan, Wong, and Zhang 2015), tax avoidance (Cen, Maydew, Zhang, and Luo 2017), 
and investors’ information search (Madsen 2017). 
7 On some occasions, supplier managers discuss customers’ news in the press release of earnings guidance. Qualcomm, 
for example, lowered its revenue forecasts for 2015 from a range of $26.3 billion to $28 billion to a range of $25 
billion to $27 billion in April 2015, announcing that the lowered guidance was in response to the news from Samsung 
Electronics (Forbes, April 22, 2015). In December, 2014, MasTec, a telecommunications and energy infrastructure 
service provider, announced that the company expects its non-GAAP earnings per share for 2015 to be $1.87, lowering 
it from the previous guidance range of $2.00 to $2.15. As a reason for this lowered guidance, MasTec management 
states, “a major customer has announced reduced levels of 2015 expected wireless-project activity” (Dow Jones 
Newswires, December 17, 2014). 





SFAS No. 131 and SEC Regulation S-K require a firm to report the sales to and identity of any 
customer that comprises more than 10% of the firm’s consolidated revenue. Since customers and 
suppliers establish economic links via various implicit and explicit arrangements, such as long-term 
contracts, strategic alliances, and relationship-specific investments, this disclosure is useful to 
investors, particularly when they assess the supplier’s future performance (Ellis et al. 2012). When 
a major customer exhibits strong earnings growth, for example, the customer’s demand for products 
from its supplier will likely grow and hence increase the supplier’s revenue and earnings. In contrast, 
when the customer experiences an earnings decline or financial distress, the customer may take 
actions that negatively affect its supplier’s performance, such as reducing product purchases, 
delaying payments, and defaulting on long-term contracts. If the relationship breaks down due to the 
customer’s poor performance, the supplier must spend resources to find alternative customers. Such 
breakup and switching costs can have substantial, undesirable impacts on the supplier. Consistent 
with the above arguments, prior studies document that suppliers experience information spillover at 
the time of their customers’ monthly sales announcements (Olsen and Dietrich 1985), bankruptcy 
filings (Hertzel, Li, Officer, and Rodgers 2008), or quarterly EAs (Pandit et al. 2011), as evidenced 
by suppliers’ significant stock price responses to customers’ news. Cohen and Frazzini (2008) further 
find that customers’ stock returns predict their suppliers’ stock returns in subsequent months. 
Prior studies also investigate the effect of the supply-chain relationship on accounting policies. 
For instance, Raman and Shahrur (2008) find that suppliers and customers engage in earnings 
management to mislead their counterparts into undertaking suboptimal relationship-specific 
investments. Hui et al. (2012) find that suppliers and customers with bargaining power prefer more 
conservative financial reporting from their counterparts, because, like creditors, they are more 
concerned with bad news about their counterparts’ prospects due to their asymmetric payoffs. In 





addition, Dou, Hope, and Thomas (2013) find that to reduce suppliers’ concerns about the 
breakdown of the supply-chain relationship, firms in countries with weak contract enforceability 
or in industries with greater relationship-specific investments tend to smooth earnings more. 
Taken together, these studies suggest that a major customer’s performance is related to its 
supplier’s firm value and that the supply-chain relationship influences the properties of earnings. 
Despite a growing list of studies on the supply chain, however, research on the effect of the 
customer’s information events on its supplier’s voluntary disclosure is notably absent. 
Literature on Voluntary Disclosure 
Voluntary disclosure theories suggest that managers disclose information when the benefits of 
disclosures exceed their costs (Verrecchia 1983; 2001). Prior studies indicate that the main benefits 
from voluntary disclosures are a reduction in information asymmetry and a lower cost of capital 
(Fishman and Hagerty 1989; Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; Baiman and Verrecchia 1996). 
Consistent with this prediction, empirical studies document that voluntary dissemination of 
management earnings guidance reduces information asymmetry (Ajinkya and Gift 1984; Kasznik 
and Lev 1995; Coller and Yohn 1997) and cost of capital (Botosan 1997; Sengupta 1998). 
Voluntary disclosures, however, incur dissemination costs and costs to correct potential 
misinterpretation, as well as litigation and reputation costs associated with failing to meet 
expectations set by earnings guidance (Healy and Palepu 2001). Proprietary costs arising from the 
product market competition are also an important deterrent to full disclosure (Verrecchia 1983). 
Moreover, disclosures reduce managers’ information advantage and thus can decrease potential 
profits from insider trading (Baiman and Verrecchia 1996). By inviting investors’ attention and 
monitoring, disclosures can also reduce managers’ consumption of perks and control over the firm 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1989). 





In addition to benefits and costs, prior studies also examine the determinants of voluntary 
disclosure. They find that managers provide voluntary disclosures to avoid large earnings surprises 
and high stock volatility (Ajinkya and Gift 1984), signal their ability (Trueman 1986), decrease 
information asymmetry and cost of capital (Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; Coller and Yohn 1997; 
Easley and O’Hara 2004), and reduce litigation risk (Skinner 1994). We add to this literature by 
examining how supply-chain relationships influence disclosure decisions. As we examine external 
signals from customers as determinants of voluntary disclosure, our study is related to the work of 
Bergman and Roychowdhury (2008) and Sletten (2012), who document an increase in earnings 
guidance following unfavorable external signals. In particular, Bergman and Roychowdhury (2008) 
examine whether firms react strategically to investor sentiment via disclosures and find that during 
low-sentiment (high-sentiment) periods, managers increase guidance to walk up long-horizon 
earnings estimates (reduce long-horizon guidance). Sletten (2012) examines whether a decline in 
stock price (due to financial restatement by an industry peer) prompts managers to voluntarily 
disclose information that was unfavorable prior to the event but became favorable at a lower stock 
price after the event. She finds that managers are more likely to release good news guidance 
following a stock price decline but that an increase in stock price does not affect earnings guidance. 
While closely related, our study differs from these two studies, as we focus on information 
demand arising from uncertainties that investors face when incorporating a customer’s news into 
the supplier valuation. Given that investors are not fully informed about the details of supply-chain 
specifics and that there exists uncertainty about the supplier’s reactions to the customer’s news, 
we examine whether an external signal from the customer’s EA can lead to a greater information 
demand and thus more earnings guidance. In contrast, Bergman and Roychowdhury (2008) 
examine how managers react strategically to external signals, and Sletten (2012) focuses on how 





managers, having a disclosure threshold (Dye 1985; Verrecchia 1983), make disclosure decisions 
in response to an exogenous stock price change. 
Hypothesis Development 
A major customer’s EAs are important information events for its supplier’s investors, because 
the EAs enable these investors to revise their expectations about the supplier’s future earnings and 
cash flows on a regular basis (Pandit et al. 2011). To the extent that the customer’s news is useful 
in valuing the supplier, the news can decrease investors’ demand (and hence the supplier managers’ 
incentive) for earnings guidance. That is, information transfers can substitute for voluntary 
disclosure. A few studies document evidence consistent with the substitution effect. Pownall and 
Waymire (1989), for example, estimate information transfers using the annual EAs of other firms 
in the same industry and find that non-guiders receive a greater magnitude of information transfers 
than guiders do. They argue that this result is consistent with managers being less likely to issue 
guidance when alternative sources of information are available to investors in forming earnings 
expectations. Lang and Lundholm (1996) find that after controlling for a firm’s own earnings, the 
earnings of other firms in the same industry offer incremental explanatory power for the firm’s 
returns, suggesting that intra-industry information transfers can serve as a signal that meets 
investors’ information demands. Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter’s (2012) model shows that when 
the private signals of two managers (a leader and a follower) are positively correlated, the follower 
free rides by disclosing less than the leader, thereby avoiding the cost of disclosure. 
Although the customer’s EA news provides useful information about the supplier’s future 
prospects, there is also an idiosyncratic component in the supplier valuation that is not fully 
impounded in the supplier’s price reaction to the customer’s EA. For example, in response to the 
customer’s EA news, the supplier could alter its operating strategy, product mix, or investment 





decisions, all of which would be private information residing with the supplier’s manager but not 
observed by external investors. Moreover, investors do not possess a full set of private information 
on supply-chain specifics, such as details of transactions with the customer, relationship-specific 
investments, order backlog, and receivables related to the customer. External investors then would 
have diffuse priors about the supplier’s anticipated actions in response to the customer’s EA news, 
which in turn would increase their demand for disclosure from the supplier’s managers. 
As discussed above, while disclosures can benefit investors, they are also costly. Therefore, when 
facing investors’ demand for disclosure, the supplier’s managers issue earnings guidance only if the 
benefits exceed the costs. We predict that as the customer’s EA news deviates more from the 
market’s expectation, investors would consider earnings guidance more useful and hence the benefit-
cost ratio of disclosure would increase. This is because, given that investors are not fully informed 
about the details of supply-chain specifics and face uncertainty about the supplier’s reactions to the 
customer’s news, the customer’s news with a larger surprise would exacerbate the information 
asymmetry between the supplier’s managers and external investors. Thus, investors are more likely 
to demand disclosures when the customer’s EA news is more surprising. Dye (1985) suggests that 
managers have a greater incentive to provide voluntary disclosures when market participants find 
the disclosures useful in assessing firm value. Chen, DeFond, and Park (2002) also argue that 
managers disclose information voluntarily when investors find such information more useful.8 
If the supplier’s managers do not respond to the disclosure demands following a large surprise 
in the customer’s news, information asymmetry between investors and managers is likely to 
increase to a greater extent, which may result in a higher cost of capital, lower stock liquidity, 
greater earnings surprises at the supplier’s own EA, and more volatile stock prices. Therefore, we 
                                                
8 Chen et al. (2002) find that managers include a balance sheet with quarterly EAs when current earnings are less 
informative and future earnings are more uncertain. 





predict that managers’ perceived benefits from earnings guidance (relative to its costs) are likely 
to increase in the magnitude of the customer’s EA news. In other words, when the customer’s EA 
news deviates more from the market’s expectation, investors’ information demands would be 
greater and the supplier’s managers would be more likely to issue earnings guidance to meet those 
demands. Thus, we propose our first hypothesis in an alternative form, as follows: 
H1: A supplier is more likely to issue earnings guidance subsequent to its major customer’s 
earnings announcement when the announcement conveys news that deviates more from the 
market’s expectation, other things being equal. 
 
We next examine several factors that could explain the cross-sectional variations in the effect 
of the customer’s EA news on its supplier’s earnings guidance. The premise behind H1 is that 
supplier investors are not as informed about supply-chain specifics as managers and face 
uncertainties regarding the supplier’s reactions to the customer’s news. Given this premise, we 
expect investors to better interpret the customer’s news and assess its value implications when the 
supply-chain information environment is rich. Cohen and Frazzini (2008), for example, suggest 
that common institutional investors (i.e., those owning shares of both the customer and the supplier) 
are more likely to collect information about customer-supplier relationships and monitor both 
firms more closely, allowing information about the relationships to be impounded into stock prices 
more quickly. Similarly, Guan et al. (2015) argue that compared to other analysts, supply-chain 
analysts (i.e., those following both the customer and the supplier) can better understand the 
customer’s contribution to the supplier’s revenue and profit; they find that supply-chain analysts 
provide more accurate earnings forecasts for the supplier, especially subsequent to the customer’s 
EA, than other analysts. Therefore, for a given amount of the customer’s EA news, to the extent 
that common investors and supply-chain analysts help facilitate information processing of the 





customer’s EA, both investors’ demand for earnings guidance and managers’ benefit-cost ratio of 
the guidance would be lower. 
Another factor related to the supply-chain information environment is industry or geographic 
commonality between the customer and the supplier. When the customer operates in the same 
industry as its supplier, investors can better process the customer’s EA news to gauge the supplier’s 
future prospects, because investors are equipped with industry-specific knowledge with which they 
can better evaluate the industry-specific implications of the customer’s news. Similarly, when the 
two firms are located in the same geographic area, they are affected by the same features of the 
local environment, such as local economic conditions, local labor and product markets, and local 
regulations. As a result, investors can better interpret location-specific implications of the 
customer’s EA news.9  Again, under these situations, for a given magnitude of the customer’s EA 
news, both investors’ demand for disclosure and the benefit-cost ratio of the guidance would be 
lower. The above discussion leads to the following hypothesis in an alternative form: 
H2: The effect of a major customer’s earnings announcement on its supplier’s earnings guidance 
(as stated in H1) is weaker when the two firms share common investors, supply-chain analysts, a 
common industry, or a common location, other things being equal. 
 
We also explore the role of the importance of the relationship that a supplier maintains with its 
customer. A relationship with a major customer is likely more important to the supplier if the 
relationship results in higher and more persistent net cash flows or relatively lower risk. One of the 
factors affecting the supplier’s cash flows or risk is the relationship-specific investments that the 
supplier often makes to serve its customers (Williamson 1975; Klein, Crawford, and Alchian 1978; 
Klein 2000; Raman and Shahrur 2008). When the supplier makes a larger amount of relationship-
specific investments, its performance would be more sensitive to the customer’s news and 
                                                
9 Prior studies find that firms headquartered in the same geographic area exhibit stronger return co-movement than 
other firms do (Pirinsky and Wang 2006; Barker and Loughran 2007). 





accordingly, investors’ demand for disclosure would be higher. Customer replaceability can also 
affect the importance of the relationship since the termination of the supplier-customer relationship 
incurs non-trivial costs to a supplier, including time, effort, and financial risk involved in switching 
from one major customer to another one (Ellis at al. 2012). Thus, if the supplier cannot easily 
identify an alternative customer, the current customer would be more important to the supplier. 
Conversely, if the supplier can easily replace the current customer, the customer’s EA news would 
be less important to the supplier’s future prospects, lowering investors’ demand for disclosure. We, 
therefore, predict that the relation between the customer’s EA news and the supplier’s earnings 
guidance would be weaker when replacing the incumbent customer is relatively easier. The above 
discussion leads to the following hypothesis in an alternative form: 
H3: The effect of a major customer’s earnings announcement on its supplier’s earnings guidance 
(as stated in H1) is stronger (weaker) when the supplier makes a larger relationship-specific 
investment (when the replaceability of the customer is higher), other things being equal. 
 
Lastly, we examine whether the effect of the customer’s EA news on its supplier’s earnings 
guidance is asymmetric with respect to the direction of the news. Hui et al. (2012) suggest that a 
supplier incurs substantial costs when its customer experiences poor performance or financial distress 
but gains only moderately when the customer performs better than expected, causing the supplier to 
have asymmetric payoffs with respect to the customer’s performance. In addition, suppliers are known 
to suffer from hold-up problems, which result in underinvestment due to uncertainty regarding their 
customers’ future performance and payments (Drake and Haka 2008). The lower than optimal 
investment, in turn, can limit the benefits that suppliers could enjoy when they face a positive demand 
shock from their customers who perform better than expected. In contrast, the potential downside 
associated with the customer’s poor performance comes in various forms, including disruption of long-
term contracts, delayed payments, lower returns on relationship-specific investments, and customer 





switching costs.10 Therefore, we expect investors to be more concerned about negative news and thus 
their demands for disclosure to be greater when the customer’s EA news is negative than when it is 
positive. In line with this expectation, we posit the following hypothesis in an alternative form: 
H4: The effect of a major customer’s earnings announcement on its supplier’s earnings guidance 
(as stated in H1) is stronger when the customer’s EA news is negative than when it is positive, 
other things being equal. 
 
III. DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
Data and Sample Selection 
We obtain information on customer-supplier relationships from the Compustat segment customer 
file. Since the database reports only the names of the major customers without identifiers, we match 
customers to their respective Compustat identifiers (i.e., GVKEY) manually, following the 
identification and classification procedure discussed in Banerjee et al. (2008).11 We next use the IBES 
Guidance file to identify firms that issue earnings guidance. Additional data are obtained from 
Compustat (for financial variables), CRSP (for stock return variables), Thomson Reuters (for 
institutional investor variables), IBES (for analyst variables), and SDC (for equity offering variables). 
Our research design requires a one-to-one pair of a supplier and its major customer in each 
year. In cases where a supplier reports multiple customers, we select the customer that contributes 
the largest amount of sales to the supplier during the fiscal year.12  We then merge these data with 
the customer’s quarterly EAs from IBES. Specifically, for each supplier firm-year, we choose its 
major customer’s first EA after 90 days from the supplier’s previous fiscal year-end (which allows 
                                                
10 In addition, major customers who experience poor performance are more likely to ask their dependent suppliers to 
provide contracting concessions, for example, by lowering prices and extending trade credit. 
11 If the customer’s GVKEY is not uniquely identified or the dollar amount of sales to the customer is not available, 
we drop the firm from our sample. 
12 We choose this research design because when a supplier has multiple customers, the supplier is unlikely to issue multiple 
forecasts over a short time period as separate responses to different customers. We recognize, however, that the occurrence 
of other customers’ EAs over the same 45-day window can introduce noise into our tests. In untabulated analyses, we repeat 
our tests after removing such cases from the sample and find that our inferences remain qualitatively the same. 





time for the customer information in the supplier’s 10-K to be publicly available). To avoid the 
effect of the Fair Disclosure Regulation (Reg FD), we restrict the sample to firms covered by IBES 
between 2001 and 2012. After removing observations with missing values for control variables, 
we obtain a final sample of 8,434 supplier firm-years that have their major customers’ EA data.13 
Regression Model 
Our study examines a supplier’s earnings guidance decision during a short period after its 
customer’s information release. For this purpose, we focus on the customer’s EAs as major information 
events providing news to the market (including the customer’s earnings guidance and any other 
information bundled with the EA). To test H1, we estimate the following probit model in equation (1): 
DISC = α0 + α1ABS(C_CAR) + α2ABS(S_CAR) + α3CORR + α4RET45D + α5INST  
+ α6ANALYST + α7VOL + α8MTB + α9LOG(AT) + α10ROA + α11RET + α12LOSS 
 + α13EQISS + α14NUMSEG + α15LIT + Industry & Year dummies + ε  (1) 
  
In equation (1), DISC is an indicator variable that equals one if the supplier issues any voluntary 
earnings guidance (either quarterly or annual) within a 45-day period after its customer’s EA, and 
zero otherwise.14 Our main variable of interest, ABS(C_CAR), is the absolute value of C_CAR, 
which is the customer’s cumulative market-adjusted return over the two-day period starting from the 
customer’s EA date. We use the absolute return, not the signed (raw) return, to capture the customer’s 
news, because H1 pertains to the magnitude of the news irrespective of its sign.15 Compared to the 
                                                
13 We remove suppliers from the sample if they issue earnings guidance just one day after the customer’s EA (i.e., on 
day +1). Because the customer’s EA news is measured as the market reaction up to day +1, earnings guidance issued 
on day +1 is unlikely to be a response to the customer’s EA news. Our inferences remain the same, however, when 
these suppliers are included in the sample. 
14 Consistent with prior work on management earnings guidance (e.g., Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and Sengupta 2005), we exclude 
preannouncements (i.e., earnings guidance issued after the fiscal period end but before the actual EAs) in defining DISC. 
Preannouncements are regarded as a part of a firm’s EA strategy rather than a guidance strategy (Houston, Lev, and 
Tucker 2010). Our inferences do not change, however, if we include preannouncements as earnings guidance. 
15 Specifically, H1 predicts that the supplier is more likely to issue earnings guidance when the customer’s EA news 
deviates more from the market’s expectation, regardless of whether the type of the news is good or bad. Our subsequent 
tests for H4 modify the model to examine whether the relation is asymmetric with respect to the type of news. 





news inferred from analyst forecast errors, this market-based measure provides a more 
comprehensive metric of the customer’s EA news, which includes the customer’s bundled earnings 
guidance, if any, and any news related to the customer’s revenue and operating investments disclosed 
over the EA window. Thus, ABS(C_CAR) captures the magnitude of the total news available to the 
market, as impounded in the customer’s stock price. H1 implies α1 > 0 in equation (1).16 
As a control variable, ABS(S_CAR) is the absolute value of S_CAR, the supplier’s cumulative 
market-adjusted return over the two-day period starting from the customer’s EA date, capturing 
customer-related information directly incorporated in the supplier’s stock price over the customer’s 
EA window. If information transfers substitute for disclosure from the supplier (Pownall and Waymire 
1989; Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter 2012), the coefficient on this variable would be negative. Prior 
studies indicate that C_CAR is positively correlated with S_CAR (e.g., Pandit et al. 2011), and we find 
a similar correlation between ABS(C_CAR) and ABS(S_CAR). 17  Therefore, in the presence of 
ABS(S_CAR) in the same regression, ABS(C_CAR) captures the residual of ABS(C_CAR), i.e., the 
part of the customer’s news that has not been impounded in the supplier valuation. In other words, we 
isolate the information demand effect of the customer’s news from the substitution effect of 
information transfer as reflected in ABS(S_CAR). We also include CORR, the return correlation 
between the two firms over the one-year period prior to the customer’s EA, to control for the normal 
(expected) co-movement of the two firms’ returns (Pandit et al. 2011). Including this variable ensures 
that our test reflects the incremental effect of new information released via the customer’s EA.18 
                                                
16 The regression models we use to test H2 to H4 are similar to equation (1), except that we further include interaction 
variables on the right-hand side of the equations for H2 and H3, and replace ABS(C_CAR) with P_ABS(C_CAR) and 
N_ABS(C_CAR) for H4. We discuss those models later in corresponding sections. 
17 In our sample, the correlation between C_CAR and S_CAR is 0.104, while the correlation between ABS(C_CAR) 
and ABS(S_CAR) is 0.144. Both correlations are significant at p < 0.01. 
18 The coefficient on this variable could be positive if a high correlation makes it easier for managers to produce 
earnings guidance, but it could be negative if it reduces the benefits of voluntary disclosures (Gong, Li, and Zhou 
2013). Our results do not change when we use the absolute value of CORR instead of CORR. 





Following prior work on voluntary disclosures (e.g., Ajinkya et al. 2005; Hutton 2005), we 
include a set of firm characteristics as control variables. RET45D, market-adjusted returns 
compounded over the 45-day period after the customer’s EA, is included to control for the effect of 
the supplier’s stock performance during the same period over which DISC is measured. We expect 
a positive coefficient on RET45D, because firms with higher stock performance are more likely to 
make disclosures (Miller 2002). We control for INST (i.e., institutional investors’ ownership) and 
ANALYST (i.e., number of analysts following the firm), because these variables are likely to be 
correlated with the demand for disclosures (e.g., Ajinkya et al. 2005; Hutton 2005). 
Further, we control for other firm characteristics, such as VOL (i.e., stock return volatility), MTB 
(i.e., market-to-book ratio), LOG(AT) (i.e., natural logarithm of total assets), ROA (i.e., return on 
assets), RET (i.e., annual stock returns), LOSS (i.e., an indicator of loss incidence), EQISS (i.e., an 
indicator of equity issuance), NUMSEG (i.e., number of segments), and LIT (i.e., litigation risk). While 
higher volatility (VOL) could make forecasting earnings more difficult and thus reduce the likelihood 
of earnings guidance, higher growth opportunities (MTB) are likely to incentivize managers to issue 
earnings guidance to access external capital markets. Larger firms (LOG(AT)) are more likely to issue 
earnings guidance, because they have more resources. In addition to RET45D, we further include long-
term accounting and stock performance variables, such as ROA, RET, and LOSS, to control for the 
effect of the firm’s performance. A firm has a greater incentive to disclose upon equity issuance 
(EQISS). The number of segments (NUMSEG) is likely to have a negative effect on earnings guidance 
if operational complexity increases forecasting difficulty. Litigation risk (LIT) is expected to be 
positively associated with earnings guidance if silence is more likely to trigger litigation. 
Finally, we include industry- (based on the Fama-French 48 industry classification) and year-fixed 
effects to control for potential heterogeneity across industries and time. Appendix A provides detailed 





definitions of all variables. To avoid undue influences of outliers, we winsorize continuous variables 
at 1% and 99%. We calculate two-sided p-values with standard errors adjusted by clustering industry 
and year-month (based on the customer’s EA date). 
Descriptive Statistics  
Panel A of Table 1 reports the distribution of sample firms by industry. Durable manufacturers 
comprise the largest number of our sample firms (28%), followed by computer companies (25%), 
pharmaceuticals (10%), services (5%), and textile and printing/publishing (5%), suggesting that 
most of the sample firms operate in manufacturing industries. Their major customers, however, 
appear to operate in quite different industries. Durable manufacturers, computer companies, 
pharmaceuticals, services, and textile and printing/publishing comprise only 19%, 15%, 7%, 2%, 
and 1% of customers, respectively. In addition, not surprisingly given their customer-supplier 
relationships, roughly 30% of customers operate in the retail industry. 
Panel B of Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the variables. The mean value of DISC 
is 0.140, suggesting that 14% of sample firms issue earnings guidance within a 45-day period after 
their customers’ EAs. This figure is smaller than those in other studies, because we restrict earnings 
guidance to that issued within a short time period after the EAs. The mean ABS(C_CAR) is 0.042, 
with 4,265 observations of positive C_CAR (with an average of 0.042) and 4,169 observations of 
negative C_CAR (with an average of -0.041). In comparison, the mean ABS(S_CAR) is 0.035, 
with 4,198 observations of positive S_CAR (with an average of 0.036) and 4,236 observations of 
negative C_CAR (with an average of -0.033). 
Panel C of Table 1 reports the Pearson correlations of the variables. ABS(C_CAR) and 
ABS(S_CAR) are significantly positively correlated, consistent with prior research. We note, 
however, that the directions of their correlations with the supplier’s earning guidance (DISC) are 





different. We find that ABS(C_CAR) is positively correlated with DISC, though this univariate 
correlation is statistically insignificant. In contrast, ABS(S_CAR) is significantly negatively 
correlated the DISC. This result is consistent with ABS(S_CAR) reflecting part of the customer’s 
news impounded in the supplier’s stock price and hence lowering investors’ demand for disclosure. 
Thus, in a regression that includes ABS(S_CAR) as a control variable, ABS(C_CAR) would 
capture the residual of ABS(C_CAR), i.e., the part of the customer’s news that has not been 
impounded in the supplier valuation. The signs of the correlations between DISC and other control 
variables are largely consistent with those in prior research.19 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
Effect of the Customer’s EA News on Earnings Guidance: Test of H1 
Table 2 reports the result from estimating equation (1). It shows that the coefficient on 
ABS(C_CAR) is positive and significant at p < 0.01, indicating that the likelihood of earnings guidance 
increases with the magnitude of customer EA news. As expected, the coefficient on ABS(S_CAR) is 
negative and significant at p < 0.01, suggesting that the customer’s news impounded in the supplier 
valuation lowers investors’ demand for disclosure and, as a response, the supplier’s managers are less 
likely to issue earnings guidance (i.e., the substitution effect of information transfers). With 
ABS(S_CAR) being controlled for in the same regression, a significantly positive coefficient on 
ABS(C_CAR) implies that the part of the customer’s EA news that has not been impounded in the 
supplier valuation is positively associated with investors’ demand for supplier disclosure. 
                                                
19 There are two variables whose correlations with DISC are not consistent with our predictions. First, EQISS is negatively 
correlated with DISC. One potential explanation is that issuers may restrain themselves from issuing earnings guidance to 
avoid gun-jumping violations prior to equity offers. Second, NUMSEG is positively correlated with DISC. This variable, 
however, is highly correlated with LOG(AT), possibly capturing the size effect when considered at the univariate level. 





Holding the control variables at their respective means, the marginal change in the probability 
of earnings guidance is about 1% when ABS(C_CAR) increases from the first to the third quartile 
of the sample distribution. This marginal effect is economically meaningful and not too large to 
be implausible, given that the unconditional probability of earnings guidance is only about 14% in 
our sample. The results on the control variables are, by and large, consistent with our expectations. 
We find that the likelihood of earnings guidance increases with institutional ownership (INST), 
the number of analysts following (ANALYST), firm size (LOG(AT)), and litigation risk (LIT), 
while the likelihood decreases with stock return volatility (VOL). Overall, the results in Table 2 
are consistent with H1, which predicts that suppliers are more likely to issue earnings guidance 
when their major customers’ EAs convey the news that deviates more from the market’s 
expectation.20, 21 
To ensure that these results are not driven by any confounding macroeconomic and/or industry-
specific shocks common to both the customer and the supplier, we perform a series of falsification 
tests and report the results in Table 3. In Column (1), we measure ABS(PRE_C_CAR) as the 
absolute value of the customer’s cumulative market-adjusted returns over the pre-EA period (-15, 
-2) and replace ABS(C_CAR) with ABS(PRE_C_CAR) in equation (1). If a common shock prior 
to the customer’s EA is behind both the customer’s EA news and the supplier’s earnings guidance, 
                                                
20 In an untabulated analysis, we calculate the changes in the magnitude of a customer’s earnings news as the absolute 
value of the customer’s EA returns in year t minus the corresponding returns in year t-1. If this change (i.e., 
ΔABS(C_CAR)) is positive (negative), we interpret it as larger-than-usual (smaller-than-usual) customer news. We 
also calculate the changes in earnings guidance in year t relative to year t-1 (i.e., ΔDISC), which, by construction, 
takes a value of 1, 0, or -1. We find that the mean ΔDISC is 0.135 for firms with larger-than-usual customer news, 
suggesting that such news is likely to increase earnings guidance. In contrast, the mean ΔDISC is -0.002 which is not 
significantly different from zero for firms with smaller-than-usual customer news, consistent with voluntary 
disclosures being sticky. 
21 When we remove ABS(S_CAR) and re-estimate equation (1) in an untabulated analysis, we continue to find a 
significantly positive coefficient on ABS(C_CAR), mitigating a concern that our result may be driven by a high 
correlation between ABS(C_CAR) and ABS(S_CAR). 





we should observe a strong relation between ABS(PRE_C_CAR) and DISC. The results reported 
in Column (1), however, show that the coefficient on ABS(PRE_C_CAR) is statistically 
insignificant, suggesting that the results in Table 2 are unlikely to be attributable to common 
macroeconomic and/or industry-specific shocks prior to the customer’s EA.22 
In Column (2), we conduct another falsification test using a sample of pseudo-suppliers. 
Specifically, for each customer-supplier pair, we randomly select a pseudo-supplier from a group 
of firms matched based on the supplier’s three-digit SIC code and its fiscal year-end. Then we 
examine the pseudo-supplier’s earnings guidance decisions subsequent to the original customer’s 
EA. If the supplier’s earnings guidance is a response to a macroeconomic or industry-wide shock 
common to both the customer and the supplier, similar findings would be observed for pseudo-
suppliers selected from industry peers. The results reported in Column (2) of Table 3 show that 
our variable of interest, ABS(C_CAR), has an insignificant coefficient, further mitigating the 
concern that our results in Table 2 are driven by common shocks.23 
Robustness Checks 
We perform several robustness checks and report the results in Table 4. First, we examine the 
robustness of our results to using an alternative measure of the customer’s EA news not incorporated 
in supplier returns. When ABS(S_CAR) is controlled for in equation (1) for our main analysis, 
ABS(C_CAR) captures the residual of ABS(C_CAR) obtained from a regression of this variable 
on all other independent variables included in equation (1). To ensure that our results are driven 
by the customer’s EA news not impounded in the supplier valuation, we re-estimate equation (1) 
                                                
22 Alternatively, we include ABS(PRE_C_CAR) as a control variable in equation (1) and find that the coefficient on 
ABS(C_CAR) is still significantly positive, while the coefficient on ABS(PRE_C_CAR) is insignificant. The results 
are also similar when ABS(PRE_C_CAR) is measured over an alternative pre-EA period (-30, -2). 
23 Our results of the cross-sectional analyses involving industry commonality (which are reported in Column (3) of 
Table 5) also mitigate the possibility that the results in Table 2 are driven by a common industry shock. We find that 
industry commonality reduces the effect of the customer’s EA news on the supplier’s earnings guidance, which is 
contradictory to what would be predicted if a common industry shock were driving our main results. 





after replacing ABS(C_CAR) with ABS(C_RES), which is the absolute value of the residual of 
C_CAR, denoted as C_RES, obtained from a regression of signed C_CAR on signed S_CAR. As 
reported in Column (1), the coefficient on ABS(C_RES) is positive and significant at p < 0.01, while 
the coefficient on ABS(S_CAR) remains negative and significant, confirming that the likelihood of 
suppliers issuing earnings guidance increases with the magnitude of the residual of the customer’s 
news not  reflected in supplier returns.24 
Second, if suppliers issue earnings guidance regularly at every EA, they likely issue guidance 
following a predetermined schedule, not as discretionary responses to the customer’s EA news. 
Although the inclusion of such guidance would work against our finding, we perform a sensitivity 
check after excluding suppliers that issue guidance regularly at their EA, regardless of the 
customer’s EA news, from the sample. Specifically, we regard a supplier as being committed to a 
predetermined disclosure schedule if it issues bundled earnings guidance at every EA over the past 
four fiscal quarters, and we remove those firms from the sample. Using this reduced sample, we 
re-estimate equation (1) and report the results in Column (2) of Table 4. The coefficient on 
ABS(C_CAR) remains positive and significant at p < 0.01, suggesting that our main findings are 
not driven by firms committed to a predetermined guidance schedule.25 
Third, we examine the supplier’s guidance decision over a shorter or a longer horizon 
subsequent to the customer’s EA. In Column (3) (Column (4)) of Table 4, we replace the dependent 
                                                
24 ABS(C_RES) is highly correlated with the residual of ABS(C_CAR) obtained from a regression of ABS(C_CAR) 
on all other independent variables in equation (1), with a Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.94 (p-value < 0.01). 
25 We do not remove all bundled forecasts from our sample, because Rogers and Van Buskirk (2013) document that 
excluding bundled forecasts from the sample causes (1) a substantial loss of empirical power, as well as (2) the risk 
of drawing erroneous conclusions from a non-representative sample. Nevertheless, in an untabulated analysis, we 
identify suppliers with their own quarterly EAs during the 45-day period after their customers’ EAs and exclude those 
firms from the sample. Untabulated results indicate that our inferences for H1 remain unchanged. In addition, we 
alternatively regard a supplier as being committed to a predetermined disclosure policy if it issues earnings guidance 
within a 45-day period subsequent to each of the customer’s EAs over the past four quarters. Untabulated results after 
excluding those firms also confirm our inferences for H1. 





variable with DISC30 (DISC60), an indicator variable that equals one if the supplier issues 
earnings guidance within a 30-day (60-day) period after the customer’s EA, and zero otherwise. 
Consistent with the results based on a 45-day period, the coefficients on ABS(C_CAR) is 
significantly positive in both Columns (3) and (4). Untabulated results, however, show that the 
coefficient becomes insignificant when we examine the guidance decision over a 90-day period. 
Measured over a longer horizon, a firm’s earnings guidance decision is likely affected by the firm’s 
disclosure policy in place, as well as other confounding news, which potentially leads to the 
insignificant result with earnings guidance examined over a 90-day period.26 
Supply-Chain Information Environment: Test of H2 
H2 suggests that the effect of a major customer’s EA news on its supplier’s earnings guidance 
is weaker when the supply-chain information environment allows investors to better process the 
news. To test H2, we define an indicator variable, High Common, which equals one if the two 
firms share common investors, supply-chain analysts, a common industry, or a common location. 
We then add High Common and the interaction of ABS(C_CAR) with High Common to equation 
(1). 27 Specifically, we estimate the following model in equation (2). H2 implies α3 < 0. 
DISC = α0 + α1ABS(C_CAR) + α2High Common + α3ABS(C_CAR) × High Common  
 + Control Variables + ε (2) 
  
In Column (1) of Table 5, High Common is an indicator variable that equals one if the 
proportion of common investors is in the top quintile of the sample distribution, and zero otherwise. 
                                                
26 In an untabulated analysis, when we examine the guidance decision over a 14- or 21-day period, the coefficient on 
ABS(C_CAR) is insignificant, though its sign is still positive. The insignificant coefficient is likely due to weak 
statistical power associated with a small number of guidance offered during these short windows.  
27 Ai and Norton (2003) argue that inferences from estimated interaction terms in a non-linear model are biased and 
suggest an alternative way to calculate the statistical significance of interaction terms. Subsequent studies, however, 
conclude that an overall statistical inference obtained from implementing Ai and Norton’s (2003) method is unreliable 
and recommend drawing inferences directly from the estimated interaction terms in nonlinear models (Greene 2010; 
Kolasinski and Siegel 2010). We follow these subsequent studies and assess the directional effect and statistical 
significance of our interaction terms, using the results from estimating our probit models. 





The proportion of common investors is calculated as the number of institutional investors owning 
shares of both the customer and the supplier, divided by the number of institutional investors 
owning the shares of the supplier.28 The results show that while the coefficient on ABS(C_CAR) 
remains positive and significant, the coefficient on ABS(C_CAR) × High Common is negative and 
significant at p < 0.05. This result is consistent with H2. Investors holding both the customer’s and 
the supplier’s shares are likely to be more informed about supply-chain specifics, with which they 
can better evaluate the value implications of the customer’s EA news. Accordingly, for a given 
amount of the customer’s EA news, their demand for disclosure is lower, leading to a weaker relation 
between the customer’s news and the supplier’s earnings guidance. 
In Column (2) of Table 5, High Common is an indicator variable that equals one if the 
proportion of supply-chain analysts is in the top quintile of the sample distribution, and zero 
otherwise. The proportion of supply-chain analysts is calculated as the number of financial analysts 
covering both the customer and the supplier divided by the number of financial analysts covering 
the supplier. Similar to those in Column (1), the results in Column (2) show that while the 
coefficient on ABS(C_CAR) remains positive and significant, the coefficient on ABS(C_CAR) × 
High Common is negative and significant at p < 0.10. These results suggest that supply-chain 
analysts help investors better process the customer’s EA news, lowering investors’ demand for the 
supplier’s disclosure. Thus, the result in Column (2) is also consistent with H2.29 
                                                
28 Consistent with Cohen and Frazzini (2008), the proportion is scaled by the number of institutional investors, which 
controls for institutional investors’ tendency to have portfolio weights tilted toward large-cap liquid securities. In other 
words, our measure takes into account the differences in size and liquidity across suppliers in institutional holdings. 
We use a similar approach when we define High Common based on supply-chain analysts. 
29 The coefficient on High Common is significantly positive in Column (2). While we do not have a clear ex ante 
prediction for this coefficient, we conjecture that the positive coefficient may be due to supply-chain analysts 
demanding more disclosures or being more likely to follow firms with characteristics that are correlated with a 
propensity to issue earnings guidance. The positive main effect of High Common (which is unconditional on the 
customer’s EA news) is not inconsistent with the negative interaction effect (which is conditional on the customer’s 
EA news). While supply-chain analysts demand more disclosures from supplier managers (the main effect), their 





In Column (3), High Common is an indicator variable that equals one if both the customer and 
the supplier operate in the same three-digit SIC code industry, and zero otherwise. By this 
definition, about 18% of our sample firms operate in the same industry as their customers. In 
Column (3), while the coefficient on ABS(C_CAR) remains positive and significant, the 
coefficient on ABS(C_CAR) × High Common is negative and significant at p < 0.01, consistent with 
the notion that investors better assess the customer’s EA news if the customer and the supplier 
operate in the same industry, lowering their demand for disclosure. Again, this finding supports H2. 
In Column (4), High Common is an indicator variable that equals one if the distance between the 
customer and the supplier is less than 100 miles or both the customer and the supplier are located in 
the same metropolitan statistical area (MSA), and zero otherwise. By this definition, about 12% of 
our sample includes suppliers and customers that operate in a common location. We use headquarters’ 
location and obtain historical location data from WRDS SEC Analytics Suite. We find that the 
coefficient on ABS(C_CAR) × High Common is negative, as expected, but insignificant at 
conventional levels (p = 0.13), while the coefficient on ABS(C_CAR) is positive and significant. 
Overall, the results in Table 5 are largely consistent with H2. The evidence indicates that when 
the customer and the supplier share common investors, supply-chain analysts, or a common industry, 
the supplier investors’ demand for disclosure in response to the customer’s EA is weaker, because 
supplier investors are likely more informed about supply-chain or industry specifics with which they 
can better predict the supplier’s possible reactions and future prospects when evaluating the value 
                                                
presence can weaken investors’ demand for disclosure in response to the customer’s EA news (the interaction effect), 
because investors can rely on information generated by supply-chain analysts, who better process the customer’s 
earnings news (Guan et al. 2015). To put it differently, when investors are less informed due to the lack of supply-
chain analysts, they are more likely to demand earnings guidance in response to the external signals. This seems to be 
the case for the common industry effect in Column (3) of Table 5 and also for the customer replaceability effect in 
Column (2) of Table 6. 





implications of the customer’s EA news. As a result, the effect of the customer’s EA news on its 
supplier’s earnings guidance is weaker. 
Supply-Chain Characteristics: Test of H3 
H3 predicts that supply-chain characteristics capturing the importance of supply-chain 
relationships affect the relation between the customer’s EA news and the supplier’s earnings 
guidance. To test this prediction, we first define an indicator variable, High RSI, which equals one 
if the supplier’s relationship-specific investment (RSI) is in the top quintile of the sample 
distribution, and zero otherwise. A large number of studies suggest that suppliers’ R&D intensity 
serves as a reasonable proxy for suppliers’ RSI (e.g., Levy 1985; Bowen, DuCharme, and Shores 
1995; Raman and Shahrur 2008; Gu, Sanders, and Venkateswaran 2017).30 Because the magnitude 
of RSI for a customer is likely to increase with the amount of sales from the customer, following 
Gu et al. (2017), we multiply the ratio of R&D expenditures to total assets with the customer’s 
sales weight (i.e., sales generated from the customer divided by total sales). We then add High RSI 
and the interaction of ABS(C_CAR) with High RSI to equation (1). 
We also define an indicator variable, High Replace, which equals one if a supplier’s customer 
replaceability is in the top quintile of the sample distribution, and zero otherwise. Customer 
replaceability is calculated as the number of firms in the customer’s three-digit SIC code industry 
multiplied by the inverse of the customer’s sales weight (i.e., total sales divided by sales generated 
from the customer). Note that we multiply the number of firms in the industry by the inverse of 
the customer’s sales weight, because it is easier to replace the customer with another firm in the 
                                                
30 For example, Raman and Shahrur (2008) suggest that suppliers’ R&D investments are often specific to their 
relationship with major customers in many industries, such as auto manufacturers, software, aircraft engines and parts, 
biotechnology, medical instruments, and semiconductors. Levy (1985) argues that R&D-intensive industries tend to 
involve specialized inputs that require suppliers to make transaction-specific investments. Bowen et al. (1995) use the 
firm’s own R&D spending as a proxy for the extent to which the claims of its nonfinancial stakeholders are uniquely 
tied to the firm’s business. 





same industry when the customer generates a lower sales weight. We then add High Replace and 
the interaction of ABS(C_CAR) with High Replace to equation (1). 
Specifically, to test H3, we estimate the following models in equations (3a) and (3b). H3 
implies α3 > 0 in equation (3a) and α3 < 0 in equation (3b). 
DISC = α0 + α1ABS(C_CAR) + α2High RSI + α3ABS(C_CAR) × High RSI  
 + Control Variables + ε (3a) 
  
DISC = α0 + α1ABS(C_CAR) + α2High Replace + α3ABS(C_CAR) × High Replace 
 + Control Variables + ε (3b) 
  
The results reported in Column (1) of Table 6 show that while the coefficient on ABS(C_CAR) 
remains positive and significant, the coefficient on ABS(C_CAR) × High RSI is also positive and 
significant at p < 0.10. These results suggest that the effect of the customer’s EA news on the 
supplier’s earnings guidance is more pronounced when the supplier makes a greater amount of RSI 
for the customer. The results reported in Column (2) show that while the coefficient on 
ABS(C_CAR) remains positive and significant, the coefficient on ABS(C_CAR) × High Replace 
is negative and significant at p < 0.01. These results imply that the effect of the customer’s EA news 
on the supplier’s earnings guidance is weaker when the supplier can easily replace the current 
customer with another firm in the same industry. 
Overall, the results in Table 6 suggest that supply-chain characteristics capturing the importance 
of supply-chain relationships, such as the size of the relationship-specific investment and customer 
replaceability, influence the relation between the customer’s EA news and the supplier’s earnings 
guidance, consistent with H3.31 
                                                
31 In untabulated analyses, we find that the positive relation between the customer’s EA news and the supplier’s 
earnings guidance is more pronounced for suppliers with positive returns than those with negative returns, measured 
over the 45 days prior to the customer’s EA. This result suggests that investors demand additional disclosure to 
evaluate whether the supplier’s strong performance prior to the customer’s EA would continue after the customer’s 
EA. Moreover, we find that the positive relation is more pronounced for a supplier whose major customer is an industry 





Asymmetric Effect of Positive versus Negative Customer’s EA News: Test of H4  
H4 predicts that the effect of the customer’s EA news on the supplier’s earnings guidance varies 
depending on whether the news is positive or negative. To test H4, we replace ABS(C_CAR) with 
P_ABS(C_CAR) and N_ABS(C_CAR) in equation (1). P_ABS(C_CAR) is the product of 
ABS(C_CAR) and an indicator variable that equals one if C_CAR takes a positive value, and zero 
otherwise. Similarly, N_ABS(C_CAR) is the product of ABS(C_CAR) and an indicator variable 
that equals one if C_CAR takes a negative value, and zero otherwise. Specifically, to test H4, we 
estimate the following model in equation (4). 
DISC = α0 + α1P_ABS(C_CAR) + α2N_ABS(C_CAR) + Control Variables + ε                (4) 
    
H4 implies α1 < α2. The results reported in Table 7 show that while the coefficients on 
P_ABS(C_CAR) and N_ABS(C_CAR) are both positive and significant, the coefficient on 
N_ABS(C_CAR), 1.471, is greater than the coefficient on P_ABS(C_CAR), 0.492. The Chi2-test 
provided at the bottom of Table 7 indicates that the difference is statistically significant at p < 0.05. 
These results support H4, that the effects of the customer’s positive versus negative EA news are 
asymmetric with respect to its supplier’s propensity to issue earnings guidance. That is, the effect is 
stronger when the EA news is negative than when it is positive, suggesting that the demands for and 
benefits from earnings guidance are relatively greater when the customer’s EA conveys negative 
news.32 
                                                
leader (defined based on market share in sales), consistent with the industry leader’s EA providing a stronger signal 
of the state of the economy, prompting a greater investors’ disclosure demand. 
32 While Sletten (2012) argues that a negative shock to share price (triggered by the restatement of an industry peer) 
lowers a firm’s disclosure threshold by turning previously withheld bad news into good news, the findings in Table 7 
indicate that our results are unlikely to be explained by a lowered disclosure threshold after the customer’s negative 
EA news, for the following reasons. First, we find that not only the customer’s negative EA news but also its positive 
EA news induces more earnings guidance from the supplier, whereas Sletten (2012) finds a higher likelihood of 
earnings guidance only after a decrease in stock price and not after an increase in stock price. Second, in an untabulated 
analysis, we decompose ABS(S_CAR) into P_ABS(S_CAR) and N_ABS(S_CAR) and run equation (1) after 
replacing ABS(S_CAR) with P_ABS(S_CAR) and N_ABS(S_CAR). We find that the coefficients on both 






V. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
Upward versus Downward Guidance Revision 
We investigate the directional change of the supplier’s earnings guidance after the customer’s 
EA. Specifically, we define DISC_UP (DISC_DOWN) as an indicator variable that equals one if 
the firm issues earnings guidance revised upward (downward) from the guidance issued previously 
for the same period before the customer’s EA, and zero otherwise. 33  When we replace the 
dependent variable with DISC_UP in equation (1), as reported in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 8, 
all of the coefficients on ABS(C_CAR), P_ABS(C_CAR), and N_ABS(C_CAR) are significantly 
positive. We do not find such evidence, however, when we replace the dependent variable with 
DISC_DOWN in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 8. These results suggest that when managers have 
information more favorable than the news disclosed earlier, managers respond to investors’ 
disclosure demand regardless of whether the customer’s EA delivers positive or negative news. 
Components of the Customer’s EA News 
ABS(C_CAR) captures the overall magnitude of the customer’s news, which includes various 
news components disclosed at the customer’s EA (e.g., earnings news, bundled guidance news, and 
seasonal changes in revenues, costs of goods sold, and other expenses). To provide further insights 
into the effect of the customer’s EA, we re-estimate equation (1) after decomposing ABS(C_CAR) 
into several news components and report the results in Online Appendix 1. The results suggest that 
while the customer’s realized earnings substitutes for the supplier’s earnings guidance, forward-
                                                
P_ABS(S_CAR) and N_ABS(S_CAR) are significantly negative, while the difference between the two coefficients 
is statistically insignificant. That is, unlike Sletten (2012), we find that a negative shock to the supplier’s stock price 
decreases the likelihood of earnings guidance. 
33 For firm-years with DISC = 1, if no guidance was issued previously, DISC_UP and DISC_DOWN take a missing 
value and the firm-year is removed from the sample. For 713 supplier-years that issue earnings guidance both before 
and after their customer’s EA, 55% issue the same forecast (confirming guidance), followed by 29% of upward 
revision and 17% of downward revision. 





looking information unexpectedly bundled with EA and harder-to-interpret information trigger 
investors’ information demands and hence lead suppliers to issue earnings guidance. 
Alternative Explanations 
Our result is subject to several alternative explanations. First, our finding is consistent with a 
substitution story, which predicts that when the supplier return incorporates less (more) of 
customer news, the supplier would make more (less) disclosures. While we suggest that the 
residual of ABS(C_CAR), part of customer news not fully impounded in supplier valuation, is 
associated with information demand, the residual may also reflect the irrelevance of customer news 
to the supplier, raising a possibility that our result arises from the substitution effect. In our 
analyses reported in Online Appendix 2, however, we find that the residual of ABS(C_CAR) is 
significantly and positively associated with proxies for the supplier investors’ opinion divergence 
(or information demand), such as the supplier’s unexpected trading volume and stock return 
volatility, mitigating the concern that the residual only captures the irrelevance of the customer’s 
news to the supplier.34 Nonetheless, we acknowledge that our story and the substitution effect story 
are neither mutually exclusive nor at odds with each other because even under the substitution 
story, it is plausible that the supplier’s decision to issue earnings guidance in response to its 
customer EA is prompted by a perceived investor demand for disclosure.  
Second, if suppliers learn information from their customers’ EAs, they are more likely to issue 
earnings guidance and do so with improved accuracy when the customers’ EAs convey more material 
news. Although we find an improvement in the accuracy of the supplier’s guidance issued after the 
customer’s EA relative to the guidance issued before the EA in an untabulated analysis, this 
                                                
34 Alternative proxies for investors’ opinion divergence include analysts’ forecasts dispersion. However, given that 
the opinion divergence is measured over a short window subsequent to the customer’s EA, using analysts’ forecast 
dispersion is not feasible for our study because few analysts issue their forecasts for suppliers during the short period 
(e.g., within 5 or 10 trading days) immediately after their customers’ EA dates. 





improvement is no longer significant once we control for the effect of the shorter forecast horizon of 
the later guidance. In addition, in another untabulated analysis, we find no evidence that the 
improvement in accuracy is increasing in ABS(C_CAR), mitigating the possibility that direct learning 
from the customer’s EA serves as an alternative explanation for our finding. 
Lastly, managers tend to herd in their warnings, in an attempt to attribute their bad news to 
market or industry factors that are outside the managers’ control (Tse and Tucker 2010). One may 
then argue that our result is likely driven by managers’ herding to reduce apparent responsibility 
for bad news. As reported in Table 8, however, we find that supplier managers are more likely to 
issue upward-revised guidance (not downward-revised guidance) shortly after the negative as well 
as the positive EAs from their customers, mitigating the possibility that the herding in disclosures 
for a blaming game is the main driver of our results. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
We examine the effect of a major customer’s EA on its supplier’s voluntary disclosures. The 
customer’s EA delivers to the market value-relevant information about the supplier (i.e., information 
transfers), which can substitute for the supplier’s earnings guidance. To the extent that the customer’s 
EA increases uncertainties regarding the supplier’s reactions to the news and the supplier’s future 
prospects, however, it can increase the demand for earnings guidance. We find that after controlling 
for the customer’s news reflected in the supplier’s stock returns, the supplier is more likely to issue 
earnings guidance after the customer’s EA when the EA news deviates more from the market’s 
expectation. This result suggests that part of the customer’s news that has not been impounded in the 
supplier valuation is positively associated with investors’ demand for the supplier’s disclosure. 
The positive relation between the customer’s EA news and the supplier’s earnings guidance is 
less pronounced when supply-chain information environment is richer through common investors, 





supply-chain analysts, or a common industry. In addition, the effect of the customer’s EA news on 
the supplier’s earnings guidance is stronger (weaker) for suppliers with greater relationship-
specific investments (with higher customer replaceability), suggesting that the importance of the 
customer to the supplier influences investors’ demand for the supplier’s earnings guidance. 
Furthermore, the effect is stronger when the customer’s EA news is negative than positive, which 
is consistent with the supplier’s asymmetric payoffs with respect to the customer’s strong vs. poor 
performance. 
Our study makes contributions to the literature on voluntary disclosure as well as on the 
customer-supplier relationship by being the first to document that information externalities from a 
customer influence its supplier’s earnings guidance. Given that nearly one half of public firms in the 
U.S. report the identities of their major customers in annual reports (Ellis at al. 2012) and experience 
information externalities from the customer’s EA on a regular basis, our results help explain how such 
a reporting environment and recurring information externalities affect voluntary disclosure decisions. 
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DISC Indicator variable that equals one if the firm issues earnings guidance (either 
quarterly or annual) within a 45-day period after its customer’s quarterly 
earnings announcement (EA), and zero otherwise.  
  ABS(C_CAR) The absolute value of C_CAR, which is the customer’s cumulative market-
adjusted returns over the two-day period starting from the customer’s EA date.  
  ABS(S_CAR) The absolute value of S_CAR, which is the supplier’s cumulative market-
adjusted returns over the two-day period starting from the customer’s EA date. 
  CORR The correlation of the market-adjusted daily returns between the customer and 
the supplier over the one-year period prior to the customer’s EA date. 
  RET45D The firm’s market-adjusted returns measured over the 45-day period after its 
customer’s EA date. 
  INST The firm’s institutional investors’ ownership measured as the percentage shares 
held by institutional investors at the beginning of the firm’s fiscal year. 
  ANALYST The number of analysts following the firm at the beginning of the firm’s fiscal 
year. 
  VOL The firm’s stock return volatility measured as the standard deviation of daily 
returns over the firm’s fiscal year. 
  MTB The firm’s market-to-book ratio measured as the market value of common 
equity divided by the book value of common equity at the beginning of the 
firm’s fiscal year. 
  LOG(AT) The natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets at the beginning of the firm’s 
fiscal year. 
  ROA The firm’s return on assets measured as income before extraordinary items 
during the firm’s fiscal year divided by the beginning-of-period assets. 
  RET The firm’s annual returns measured by compounding daily returns over the 
firm’s fiscal year. 
  LOSS Indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s income before extraordinary 
items during the firm’s fiscal year is negative and zero otherwise. 
  EQISS Indicator variable that equals one if the firm made equity offerings during the 
firm’s fiscal year, and zero otherwise. 
  NUMSEG The firm’s number of segments.  
  LIT Indicator variable that equals one if the firm operates in one of high litigation 
industries (i.e., SIC code within 2833-2936, 3570-3577, 7370-7374, 3600-
3674, 5200-5961, and 8731-8734), and zero otherwise. 
    








Panel A: Distribution of Sample Firms by Industry 
 
Industry Description 
Sample Firms Major Customers 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Agriculture 32 0.38% 0 0.00% 
Mining and construction 94 1.11% 20 0.24% 
Food 348 4.13% 128 1.52% 
Textile and printing/publishing 413 4.90% 107 1.27% 
Chemicals 250 2.96% 171 2.03% 
Pharmaceuticals 805 9.54% 570 6.76% 
Extractive 512 6.07% 578 6.85% 
Durable manufacturers 2,381 28.23% 1581 18.75% 
Transportation 370 4.39% 641 7.60% 
Utilities 66 0.78% 214 2.54% 
Retail 290 3.44% 2494 29.57% 
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 347 4.11% 305 3.62% 
Services 436 5.17% 158 1.87% 
Computers 2,090 24.78% 1277 15.14% 
Non-classifiable 0 0.00% 190 2.25% 
Total 8,434 100.00% 8,434 100.00% 
 
Panel B: Summary Statistics 
 
 N Mean STD P25 Median P75 
DISC 8,434 0.140 0.347 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ABS(C_CAR) 8,434 0.042 0.042 0.014 0.029 0.055 
ABS(S_CAR) 8,434 0.035 0.041 0.009 0.021 0.044 
CORR 8,434 0.083 0.152 -0.015 0.057 0.150 
RET45D 8,434 0.017 0.217 -0.107 -0.002 0.110 
INST 8,434 0.445 0.342 0.073 0.456 0.756 
ANALYST 8,434 5.761 6.372 1.000 4.000 8.000 
VOL 8,434 0.038 0.022 0.023 0.032 0.047 
MTB 8,434 2.682 3.784 1.159 1.947 3.343 
LOG(AT) 8,434 5.917 1.911 4.526 5.796 7.283 
ROA 8,434 -0.033 0.216 -0.082 0.026 0.078 
RET 8,434 0.128 0.689 -0.292 0.022 0.358 
LOSS 8,434 0.389 0.487 0.000 0.000 1.000 
EQISS 8,434 0.125 0.331 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NUMSEG 8,434 4.798 2.918 2.000 4.000 6.000 
LIT 8,434 0.435 0.496 0.000 0.000 1.000 





TABLE 1 (continued) 
 
Panel C: Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
(1) DISC                
                               
(2) ABS(C_CAR) 0.015               
  (0.18)                            
(3) ABS(S_CAR)  -0.069 0.144              
  (0.00) (0.00)                          
(4) CORR 0.068 0.062 -0.008             
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.46)                        
(5) RET45D 0.016 0.019 0.073 0.011            
  (0.13) (0.08) (0.00) (0.32)                      
(6) INST 0.152 -0.045 -0.175 0.113 -0.035           
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)                    
(7) ANALYST 0.206 -0.010 -0.105 0.288 -0.029 0.376          
  (0.00) (0.36) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)                  
(8) VOL -0.136 0.168 0.410 -0.114 0.022 -0.359 -0.267         
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00)                
(9) MTB 0.025 -0.008 -0.010 0.014 -0.037 0.035 0.114 -0.050        
  (0.02) (0.47) (0.35) (0.20) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)              
(10) LOG(AT) 0.169 -0.054 -0.202 0.307 -0.039 0.447 0.650 -0.450 -0.015       
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.17)            
(11) ROA 0.105 -0.068 -0.181 0.121 0.069 0.249 0.162 -0.482 0.000 0.318      
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.97) (0.00)          
(12) RET 0.018 -0.045 0.012 -0.005 0.392 -0.030 -0.059 -0.076 -0.092 -0.023 0.192     
  (0.10) (0.00) (0.26) (0.65) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)        
(13) LOSS -0.108 0.082 0.187 -0.094 -0.057 -0.258 -0.166 0.473 -0.034 -0.297 -0.686 -0.177    
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)      
(14) EQISS -0.026 -0.016 -0.049 0.059 -0.003 0.042 0.036 -0.080 0.035 0.134 -0.017 0.060 -0.025   
  (0.02) (0.13) (0.00) (0.00) (0.78) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.12) (0.00) (0.02)    
(15) NUMSEG 0.092 0.000 -0.088 0.135 -0.014 0.163 0.246 -0.191 -0.052 0.388 0.173 0.009 -0.122 -0.011  
  (0.00) (0.98) (0.00) (0.00) (0.21) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.42) (0.00) (0.31)  
(16) LIT 0.040 0.080 0.100 -0.079 0.018 -0.070 0.127 0.178 0.089 -0.136 -0.227 -0.036 0.224 -0.065 -0.019 















This table shows the descriptive statistics. Panel A reports the distribution of sample firms by industry. Industry membership is determined by SIC 
code as follows: agriculture (0100-0999), mining and construction (1000-1999, excluding 1300-1399), food (2000-2111), textiles and 
printing/publishing (2200-2799), chemicals (2800-2824, 2840-2899), pharmaceuticals (2830-2836), extractive (1300-1399, 2900-2999), durable 
manufactures (3000-3999, excluding 3570-3579 and 3670-3679), transportation (4000-4899), utilities (4900-4999), retail (5000-5999), finance, 
insurance, and real estate (6000-6799), services (7000-8999, excluding 7370-7379), and computers (3570-3579, 3670-3679, 7370-7379).  Panel B 
reports the summary statistics of the variables used in our analyses, and Panel C reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between variables with 
p-values in parentheses. All variables are defined in Appendix A. To avoid undue influence of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorized at 












Effect of a Major Customer’s EA News on Its Supplier’s Earnings Guidance (Test of H1) 
 Pred. Coef. p-val. 
ABS(C_CAR) + 0.919*** 0.002 
ABS(S_CAR) - -1.013*** 0.005 
CORR +/- 0.141 0.499 
RET45D + 0.160 0.391 
INST + 0.329*** 0.004 
ANALYST + 0.024*** 0.002 
VOL - -5.579*** 0.005 
MTB + 0.001 0.918 
LOG(AT) + 0.062** 0.020 
ROA + 0.259 0.150 
RET + 0.043 0.259 
LOSS - -0.084 0.349 
EQISS + -0.064 0.352 
NUMSEG - 0.001 0.931 
LIT + 0.219* 0.077 
Industry Fixed Effects  yes 
Year Fixed Effects  yes 
No. of Obs.  8,434 
Pseudo R2  0.1194 
 
This table shows the results of the probit regression of DISC on customers’ earnings announcement news. 
All variables are defined in Appendix A. To avoid undue influence of outliers, all continuous variables are 
winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. Standard errors are clustered by industry (based on 
Fama-French 48 industries) and year-month (when customer’s EA occurred). *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-sided), respectively.  
 








  (1)  (2) 
 
 Pre-Announcement  
Customer News  
Pseudo-Suppler  
Sample  
 Pred. Coef. p-val.  Coef. p-val. 
ABS(PRE_C_CAR) ? -0.029 0.930    
ABS(C_CAR) ?    -0.105 0.812 
ABS(S_CAR) - -0.932** 0.012  -1.032 0.168 
CORR +/- 0.158 0.433  0.092 0.539 
RET45D + 0.164 0.381  0.084 0.518 
INST + 0.329*** 0.004  0.580*** 0.000 
ANALYST + 0.024*** 0.002  0.022*** 0.000 
VOL - -5.423*** 0.007  -3.985** 0.024 
MTB + 0.001 0.913  -0.006 0.394 
LOG(AT) + 0.062** 0.023  0.063*** 0.010 
ROA + 0.261 0.150  0.315** 0.029 
RET + 0.041 0.291  -0.050 0.215 
LOSS - -0.085 0.345  -0.158** 0.014 
EQISS + -0.063 0.362  0.201** 0.013 
NUMSEG - 0.001 0.938  -0.004 0.737 
LIT + 0.223* 0.074  0.089 0.202 
Industry Fixed Effects  yes  yes 
Year Fixed Effects  yes  yes 
No. of Obs.  8,434  7,929 
Pseudo R2  0.1188  0.1392 
 
This table shows the results of the probit regression of DISC as a falsification test. In Column (1), 
ABS(PRE_C_CAR) is the absolute value of PRE_C_CAR, which is the customer’s cumulative market-
adjusted returns over the pre-announcement period  (i.e., (-15, -2) window). In Column (2), the analysis is 
based on the pseudo-supplier sample. For each pair of customer-supplier, a pseudo-supplier is randomly 
selected from a group of firms matched based on the supplier’s three-digit SIC code and fiscal year-end. 
All other variables are defined in Appendix A. To avoid undue influence of outliers, all continuous variables 
are winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. Standard errors are clustered by industry (based on 
Fama-French 48 industries) and year-month (when customer’s EA occurred). *, **, and *** indicate 












  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
 
Using Absolute  
Residual of C_CAR 
 
Excluding Suppliers  
Committed to  
Bundled Forecasts 
 
Using DISC Measured 
over a 30-Day Period 
 
Using DISC Measured 
over a 60-Day Period 
 Pred. Coef. p-val.  Coef. p-val.  Coef. p-val.  Coef. p-val. 
ABS(C_RES) + 0.881*** 0.008          
ABS(C_CAR) +    1.139*** 0.000  0.729** 0.041  1.000*** 0.004 
ABS(S_CAR) - -0.994*** 0.006  -0.542* 0.060  -1.283*** 0.000  -1.009** 0.034 
CORR +/- 0.145 0.486  0.243 0.202  0.057 0.812  0.135 0.528 
RET45D + 0.161 0.388  0.186 0.280  0.206 0.301  0.098 0.571 
INST + 0.329*** 0.004  0.211** 0.031  0.268** 0.028  0.372*** 0.000 
ANALYST + 0.024*** 0.002  0.022*** 0.002  0.023*** 0.002  0.026*** 0.000 
VOL - -5.563*** 0.005  -3.767* 0.050  -6.611*** 0.001  -5.964*** 0.003 
MTB + 0.001 0.916  0.005 0.522  0.001 0.918  0.002 0.814 
LOG(AT) + 0.062** 0.020  0.080*** 0.001  0.050 0.111  0.069*** 0.005 
ROA + 0.258 0.149  0.244 0.160  0.231 0.245  0.245 0.156 
RET + 0.043 0.267  0.047 0.246  0.048 0.180  0.028 0.473 
LOSS - -0.085 0.347  -0.117 0.166  -0.051 0.618  -0.121 0.142 
EQISS + -0.064 0.355  0.031 0.602  -0.045 0.538  -0.056 0.419 
NUMSEG - 0.001 0.935  0.001 0.931  0.004 0.734  0.002 0.856 
LIT + 0.219* 0.076  0.150 0.229  0.223 0.139  0.196* 0.088 
Industry Fixed Effects  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Year Fixed Effects  yes  yes  yes  yes 
No. of Obs.  8,434  8,066  8,434  8,434 
















This table shows the results of the probit regression of DISC as a robustness check. In Column (1), ABS(C_CAR) is replaced with ABS(C_RES). 
C_RES is the residual of C_CAR obtained from a regression of C_CAR on S_CAR. In Column (2), the sample excludes firms that appear to commit to 
issuing bundled guidance. In Column (3), the dependent variable is redefined as an indicator variable that equals one if the firm issues earnings guidance 
(either quarterly or annual) within a 30-day period after its customer’s quarterly earnings announcement, and zero otherwise. In Column (4), the dependent 
variable is redefined as an indicator variable that equals one if the firm issues earnings guidance (either quarterly or annual) within a 60-day period after its 
customer’s quarterly earnings announcement, and zero otherwise.  All other variables are defined in Appendix A. To avoid undue influence of outliers, all 
continuous variables are winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. Standard errors are clustered by industry (based on Fama-French 48 

















Role of Supply-Chain Information Environment (Test of H2) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
 High Common 
Defined Based on 
Common Inst. Investors  
High Common 
Defined Based on 
SC Analysts 
 High Common 
Defined Based on 
Common Industry 
 High Common 
Defined Based on 
Common Location 
 Pred. Coef. p-val.  Coef. p-val.  Coef. p-val.  Coef. p-val. 
ABS(C_CAR) + 1.140*** 0.001  1.286** 0.012  1.486*** 0.001  1.167*** 0.007 
High Common  ? 0.072 0.242  0.247*** 0.008  0.230** 0.020  0.073 0.541 
ABS(C_CAR) × High Common - -1.564** 0.010  -1.431* 0.078  -2.988*** 0.000  -1.967 0.130 
ABS(S_CAR) - -1.000*** 0.005  -0.998*** 0.006  -0.945*** 0.008  -1.000*** 0.005 
CORR +/- 0.144 0.488  0.019 0.930  0.114 0.569  0.148 0.467 
RET45D + 0.161 0.390  0.156 0.406  0.160 0.389  0.159 0.394 
INST + 0.327*** 0.004  0.312*** 0.005  0.332*** 0.004  0.330*** 0.004 
ANALYST + 0.024*** 0.002  0.025*** 0.001  0.024*** 0.001  0.024*** 0.003 
VOL - -5.563*** 0.005  -5.652*** 0.005  -5.630*** 0.005  -5.604*** 0.005 
MTB + 0.001 0.910  0.001 0.904  0.001 0.932  0.001 0.921 
LOG(AT) + 0.062** 0.021  0.058** 0.038  0.064** 0.018  0.062** 0.021 
ROA + 0.262 0.146  0.265 0.147  0.268 0.143  0.259 0.150 
RET + 0.044 0.250  0.042 0.281  0.045 0.245  0.044 0.259 
LOSS - -0.083 0.358  -0.082 0.370  -0.086 0.342  -0.084 0.358 
EQISS + -0.064 0.352  -0.069 0.311  -0.065 0.352  -0.065 0.346 
NUMSEG - 0.001 0.937  0.003 0.813  0.002 0.912  0.001 0.928 
LIT + 0.219* 0.076  0.217* 0.074  0.210 0.100  0.221* 0.072 
Industry Fixed Effects  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Year Fixed Effects  yes  yes  yes  yes 
No. of Obs.  8,434  8,434  8,434  8,434 
Pseudo R2  0.1196  0.1219  0.1208  0.1197 
 
This table shows the results of the probit regression of DISC, in which the role of the supply-chain information environment is examined. In Column 
(1), High Common is an indicator variable that equals one if the proportion of common institutional investors is in the top quintile of the sample 
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distribution, and zero otherwise. The proportion of common institutional investors is calculated as the number of institutional investors holding the 
shares of both the customer and supplier divided by the number of institutional investors holding the shares of the supplier. In Column (2), High 
Common is an indicator variable that equals one if the proportion of supply-chain (SC) analysts is in the top quintile of the sample distribution, and 
zero otherwise. The proportion of common SC analysts is calculated as the number of financial analysts covering both the customer and supplier 
divided by the number of financial analysts covering the supplier. In Column (3), High Common is an indicator variable that equals one if both the 
customer and supplier operate in the same three-digit SIC code industry, and zero otherwise. In Column (4), High Common is an indicator variable 
that equals one if the distance between the customer and supplier is less than 100 miles or both the customer and supplier are located in the same 
metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. To avoid undue influence of outliers, all 
continuous variables are winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. Standard errors are clustered by industry (based on Fama-French 48 
industries) and year-month (when customer’s EA occurred). *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-
















Role of Supply-Chain Characteristics (Test of H3) 
 
  (1)  (2) 
  Relationship-Specific Investment  Customer Replaceability 
 Pred. Coef. p-val.  Coef. p-val. 
ABS(C_CAR) + 0.620* 0.089  1.478*** 0.000 
High RSI  ? -0.077 0.565    
ABS(C_CAR) × High RSI + 1.391* 0.086    
High Replace ?    0.410*** 0.000 
ABS(C_CAR) × High Replace -    -2.294*** 0.000 
ABS(S_CAR) - -1.009*** 0.004  -0.944*** 0.010 
CORR +/- 0.141 0.503  0.089 0.662 
RET45D + 0.162 0.387  0.162 0.385 
INST + 0.330*** 0.004  0.320*** 0.004 
ANALYST + 0.024*** 0.002  0.024*** 0.001 
VOL - -5.566*** 0.005  -6.111*** 0.001 
MTB + 0.001 0.910  0.001 0.873 
LOG(AT) + 0.062** 0.011  0.063** 0.020 
ROA + 0.259 0.185  0.268 0.156 
RET + 0.042 0.284  0.041 0.277 
LOSS - -0.083 0.324  -0.105 0.245 
EQISS + -0.061 0.368  -0.063 0.359 
NUMSEG - 0.001 0.954  -0.000 0.989 
LIT + 0.222* 0.068  0.198 0.115 
Industry Fixed Effects  yes  yes 
Year Fixed Effects  yes  yes 
No. of Obs.  8,434  8,434 
Pseudo R2  0.1196  0.1262 
 
This table shows the results of the probit regression of DISC, in which the role of supply-chain 
characteristics is examined. In Column (1), High RSI is an indicator variable that equals one if the supplier’s 
relationship-specific investment for the customer is in the top quintile of the sample distribution, and zero 
otherwise. The supplier’s relationship-specific investment is calculated as the firm’s R&D expenditures 
divided by total assets, multiplied by the customer’s sales weight (i.e., sales generated from the customer 
divided by total sales). In Column (2), High Replace is an indicator variable that equals one if the supplier’s 
customer replaceability is in the top quintile of the sample distribution, and zero otherwise. Customer 
replaceability is calculated as the number of firms in the customer’s three-digit SIC code industry multiplied 
by the inverse of customer’s sales weight (i.e., total sales divided by sales generated from the customer). 
All other variables are defined in Appendix A. To avoid undue influence of outliers, all continuous variables 
are winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. Standard errors are clustered by industry (based on 
Fama-French 48 industries) and year-month (when customer’s EA occurred). *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-sided), respectively.  
 
 






Asymmetric Effect of Positive versus Negative Customer’s EA News (Test of H4) 
 
 Pred. Coef. p-val. 
P_ABS(C_CAR) + 0.492** 0.046 
N_ABS(C_CAR) + 1.471*** 0.003 
ABS(S_CAR) - -0.995*** 0.004 
CORR +/- 0.140 0.502 
RET45D + 0.169 0.370 
INST + 0.329*** 0.004 
ANALYST + 0.024*** 0.002 
VOL - -5.550*** 0.005 
MTB + 0.001 0.905 
LOG(AT) + 0.063** 0.020 
ROA + 0.262 0.144 
RET + 0.044 0.262 
LOSS - -0.083 0.356 
EQISS + -0.064 0.352 
NUMSEG - 0.001 0.938 
LIT + 0.218* 0.081 
Industry Fixed Effects  yes 
Year Fixed Effects  yes 
No. of Obs.  8,434 
Pseudo R2  0.1197 
   
Test: Coefficient on P_ABS(C_CAR) = Coefficient on N_ABS(C_CAR) 
chi2-test statistic = 4.60 
p-value = 0.032 
 
This table shows the results of the probit regression of DISC and compares the effect of the positive versus 
negative customer’s EA news. P_ABS(C_CAR) is the product of ABS(C_CAR) and an indicator variable 
that equals one if C_CAR takes a positive value and zero otherwise. N_ABS(C_CAR) is the product of 
ABS(C_CAR) and an indicator variable that equals one if C_CAR takes a negative value and zero otherwise. 
All other variables are defined in Appendix A. To avoid undue influence of outliers, all continuous variables 
are winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. Standard errors are clustered by industry (based on 
Fama-French 48 industries) and year-month (when customer’s EA occurred). *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-sided), respectively. 
 
 






Upward versus Downward Guidance Revisions 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Dep. Var: DISC_UP  Dep. Var: DISC_UP  Dep. Var: DISC_DOWN  Dep. Var: DISC_DOWN 
 Pred. Coef. p-val.  Coef. p-val.  Coef. p-val.  Coef. p-val. 
ABS(C_CAR) + 1.742*** 0.002     0.397 0.755    
P_ABS(C_CAR)  +    1.651* 0.068     -0.431 0.766 
N_ABS(C_CAR)  +    2.059*** 0.008     0.967 0.492 
ABS(S_CAR) - -2.262** 0.050  -2.252* 0.053  -0.660 0.699  -0.634 0.706 
CORR +/- 0.243 0.316  0.243 0.316  0.127 0.704  0.130 0.701 
RET45D + 0.965*** 0.000  0.970*** 0.000  -0.483** 0.034  -0.475** 0.039 
INST + 0.436*** 0.000  0.437*** 0.000  0.227* 0.077  0.225* 0.081 
ANALYST + 0.011 0.313  0.011 0.315  0.004 0.375  0.004 0.393 
VOL - -1.293 0.708  -1.270 0.716  -2.702 0.346  -2.601 0.372 
MTB + 0.014** 0.033  0.014** 0.032  -0.015 0.222  -0.015 0.232 
LOG(AT) + 0.061* 0.082  0.061* 0.082  0.099*** 0.000  0.100*** 0.000 
ROA + 0.162 0.312  0.167 0.312  0.196 0.425  0.193 0.440 
RET + 0.153* 0.054  0.153* 0.055  -0.243*** 0.008  -0.239*** 0.009 
LOSS - -0.521*** 0.000  -0.519*** 0.000  -0.000 0.998  -0.000 0.997 
EQISS + 0.008 0.921  0.009 0.915  -0.055 0.635  -0.053 0.645 
NUMSEG - -0.009 0.469  -0.009 0.470  -0.010 0.640  -0.010 0.639 
LIT + 0.244* 0.071  0.242* 0.066  0.301* 0.065  0.297* 0.066 
Industry Fixed Effects  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Year Fixed Effects  yes  yes  yes  yes 
No. of Obs.  8,004  8,004  8,004  8,004 
Pseudo R2  0.1679  0.1679  0.1130  0.1138 
 
This table shows the results of the analyses on the effect of upward versus downward guidance revision. The dependent variable is DISC_UP in 
Columns (1) and (2), and DISC_DOWN in Columns (3) and (4). DISC_UP is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm issues earnings 
guidance (either quarterly or annual) within a 45-day period after its customer’s quarterly earnings announcement, revised upward from the guidance 
issued previously for the same fiscal period, and zero otherwise. DISC_DOWN is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm issues earnings 
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guidance (either quarterly or annual) within a 45-day period after its customer’s quarterly earnings announcement, revised downward from the 
guidance issued previously for the same fiscal period, and zero otherwise. If there is no guidance issued previously, DISC_UP and DISC_DOWN 
take a missing value and the firm-year is removed from the sample. P_ABS(C_CAR) is the product of ABS(C_CAR) and an indicator variable that 
equals one if C_CAR takes a positive value and zero otherwise. N_ABS(C_CAR) is the product of ABS(C_CAR) and an indicator variable that 
equals one if C_CAR takes a negative value and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. To avoid undue influence of outliers, 
all continuous variables are winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. Standard errors are clustered by industry (based on Fama-French 48 
industries) and year-month (when customer’s EA occurred). *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-




lectronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com
/abstract=
3514909
